Caleb Porter

First and foremost, if our praise for Caleb Porter hasn’t been evident, let me repeat, Caleb Porter is legit.

Previously, we’ve been judging him solely from watching his Akron team (on TV and in person). Meaning we’ve never seen him run a session – although it should be clear that to produce a possession-centered, attacking, attractive, and winning product, there must be a lot of proper work being done.

In any case, now we’ve seen his training. He’s the man!

Players

For my impressions, I simply placed them into four buckets.

Tier 1: Means you’re the best of the lot and should be in.
Tier 2: You’ve shown some interesting things, and I want to see more.
Tier 3: Grey zone. Very grey. One step away from getting the boot, or one step from Tier 2. What is certain here is these guys can not get to Tier 1. They don’t have it.
Tier 4: Leave my camp at once!

Pre-session chat. January 10, 2012

Tier 1
Amobi Okugo
Kelyn Rowe
Joe Corona

Tier 2
Isaac Acuna
Dilly Duka
Sebastien Lletget
Zarek Valentin

Tier 3
Kofi Sarkodie
Sheenan Williams
Andrew Wenger
Freddy Adu
Mike Stephens
Jared Jeffery
Mix Diskerud
Jack McInerney
Josh Gatt

Tier 4
Sebastien Ibeagha
Royal-Dominique Fennell
Jorge Villafana
Tony Taylor

For those who may be wondering how I’ve come to these conclusions, I want to say three things:

1. When you know, you know.
2. The details are everything – especially if you want to play quality soccer. This should get you started.
3. If you want some high level impressions on what I saw with some of these players, ask away.

Are they the best?

In his last post, Jacques posed an interesting question:

Is it acceptable/effective to select experienced players with incomplete skill sets and little tactical malleability? Or, is the system Klinsmann seeks to implement better served by selecting players with less pedigree but with skill sets better suited to succeed in a possession based system?

Experience or Quality?

Clearly it’s got to be quality right? I mean experience can be gained. But technical and tactical ability?

Edu is Edu.
Altidore is Altidore.
Bocanegra is Bocanegra.

Or are they?

The answer lies with the coaching staff’s capacity to assess a player’s malleability. If I were them, my initial call-ups for these friendlies would have pretty much been the same. That is, primarily the experienced guys.

This serves two purposes:

1) You can see these guys up close and personal and evaluate whether they are capable of executing a style of play they have never been taught. People can’t comprehend this, but players have a tactical ceiling. A limit to their tactical capacity while in the pressure cooker of a game. Some players can adapt to a new philosophy and execute, while others simply can not.

From the outside, the well-trained eye can do a decent job of placing players into “tactical buckets”. That is to say; “this player is capable of this, and not capable of that”. But you can never be sure until you have them under your instruction. That is why even the greatest of coaches make player selection blunders in the transfer market.

So coming back full circle, this is a reason why I would initially call most of the existing experienced players from the pool to these first camps. From there we keep those that can adapt and slowly phase out those that can’t, and phase in those young talents we believe can.

Hopefully this is what Klinsmann is doing and I choose to believe it is. Patience is in order.

2) The other reason is political. As much as we’d like to believe this doesn’t or shouldn’t influence coaching decisions, it does; and it is inescapable unless you’re a proven international badass like a Mourinho (hmmm … and even then).

Not in the sense of doing favors, but more for media control. This is as much a coach’s responsibility as is getting W’s. The federations that hire them need a net positive endorsement from the media/fanbase. Anything to the contrary is bad business.

So again, Klinsmann can’t just come in and immediately blow up the player pool. Altidore you’re toast! Bocanegra you’re toast! Edu and Bradley you’re toast!

You just can’t do it without some upheaval. Unless you have magnificent and consistent results from the get go, you’ll be questioned throughout your entire tenure. Could you imagine? People will think you’re an idiot!

So … best give these players a chance, evaluate them as described in point #1 AND let the unfit play themselves off the team in front of the entire public. That way there is little question they were not a match for this next chapter.

I hope and choose to believe this is what Klinsmann is doing. Patience is in order.

Predictably, there are still many outstanding questions regarding Juergen Klinsmann and the US national team after Klinsmann’s second and third games as US coach. On Tuesday, the US demonstrated sustained effort for 90 minutes and crafted occasional quality sequences against a Belgium team that effectively pressed the US without the ball and featured dangerous attacking talents. The US conceded an unlucky goal and arguably should have at least tied the game after a questionable offside call to disallow a goal.

Collectively, the US team’s performance was decent but lacked the spark of progress and superior quality demonstrated during the first half of the Costa Rica game. Belgium was in obvious control of many parts of the game but the US was able to put together several offensive sequences and spells of defensive pressure that allowed the US to take the protagonist role. Unfortunately, the US had neither the individual skill nor the collective tactical awareness to dictate the game for prolonged periods.

At times, the individual mistakes and collective misunderstandings against Belgium were unpleasant reminders of the stasis and mediocrity of the Bradley era. Altidore and Edu gave up possession and passed to Belgian players when under little pressure. Shea and Rogers offered no change in speed/direction and looked lost when they weren’t running head down towards goal. Bocanegra and Goodson panicked when balls were in the air and often preferred the perceived safety of playing long passes in the general direction of forward players as opposed to playing a 10-15 yard pass to a loosely marked midfielder.

Clint Dempsey was deployed as a central midfielder in a role responsible for retaining possession and dictating the tempo of the US buildup with the ball and pressuring the opposition defenders and midfielders without the ball. Dempsey’s performance against Belgium was a fascinating demonstration of the potential held by the US and what must be overcome in order to realize it.

Dempsey’s game is unique, volatile, and frustrating. Against Belgium he showed moments of inspiring brilliance and moments of head scratching ignorance of his surroundings leading to loss of possession in dangerous areas. Without the ball, he showed little intent to pressure or force the Belgian players into mistakes. Yet, despite these deficiencies he created the US’s best chance of the game almost out of nothing after a deceptive juke and dribble into the Belgian penalty box. Had his shot been better placed and led to a goal, every analysis of the game (including this one) would likely have been viewed through the lens of an exceptional goal to tie the game and secure a result after a gritty comeback performance on European soil.

This volatility from both Dempsey and the US team in general is the most important thread Klinsmann must address in order to develop the US team into a more dominant and more consistent outfit under the possession-based system he is seeking to implement.

Reflecting on the Belgium and Costa Rica games and looking forward to the October friendlies, the analysis of Klinsmann and his staff must seek to distill what must be changed to direct the US on a trajectory to become dominant no matter the opposition. Arguably, the shape/system has been a success and provided a platform for the superior stretches of play throughout Klinmann’s first three games in charge. It is the elusive matter of player selection that will define Klinsmann’s ability to shape the US into something better and more robust.

Is it acceptable/effective to select experienced players with incomplete skill sets and little tactical malleability? Or, is the system Klinsmann seeks to implement better served by selecting players with less pedigree but with skill sets better suited to succeed in a possession based system?

Are young players Brek Shea and Timmy Chandler (Both 21 years old) better suited to succeed in Klinsmann’s system than Michael Nanchoff (22) and Kofi Sarkodie (20), who both contributed greatly to Akron University playing the best possession soccer of any amateur or professional team in the United States during the last college season?

Who can complement Jose Torres in central midfield? Are Donovan and Dempsey, who have both made their careers for club and country on the wing, better suited to playing central midfield as opposed to Anthony Ampaipitakwong or any of the promising central midfielders Brian identified in his recent College Prospects post? Is Stuart Holden better than any of these players?

How far can the US go with holding midfielders that can’t pass under pressure and don’t demand the ball to dictate the tempo of the game at every opportunity? 3four3 has identified several young quality holding midfielders in college and just breaking into MLS that would likely be in the national team pool if US Soccer’s selection process was more similar to developed soccer nations. As a reminder, Sergio Busquets and his Spanish national team understudy Javi Martinez were both 22 when Spain won the WorldCup.

Finally, what will it take for Klinsmann to replace Jozy Altidore as first team Striker?Agudelo has consistently looked more dangerous, energetic and consistent than Altidore. Altidore’s first touch is not going to get better and his change of pace is non-existent. Combine these issues with lack of playing awareness and laziness without the ball and its hard to see how anyone can watch him play and come to the conclusion that he has the tools to be an effective possession based attacking player. Is it enough that he’s scored a few goals for his new club despite looking woefully out of depth whenever he plays for the national team?

Can Klinsmann sift through the noise and hype to select players of true quality that understand the commitment, awareness, and professionalism required to dominate opponents?

Klinsmann must ask these questions and the answers he provides will reflect deeply on whether he can undertake what is necessary to adapt and evolve the US team into something that reflects the unlimited soccer potential that exists in the United States.

There are promising signs that progress is underway and the next opportunity to evaluate will take place during international friendly games vs. Honduras and a yet to be named opponent in October.

On Friday, the US showed signs of progress and promise through its possession play and aggressive tactics without the ball. The revamped central midfield looked far superior as compared to the game against Mexico and provided optimism for the future progress of the US team under Klinsmann. However, the team’s lack of quality at the wide positions and overzealous tendency to play forward demonstrated the vulnerability of a team that is still adapting to the more sophisticated player responsibilities required under the system that Klinsmann is implementing. Thus, a US first half characterized by inspiring multi-touch possession sequences, high pressure without the ball, and obvious goal scoring chances devolved into a far less organized and disciplined performance in the second half that allowed Costa Rica to create opportunistic chances and score the game winning goal.

The Opposition: Costa Rica

Despite achieving an earned reputation of being the 3^rd or 4^th best team in CONCACAF, the Costa Rica team on the field Friday night was weakened and inexperienced. Costa Rica was without several regular starters and is in the midst of replacing interim coach Ronald Gonzalez before Friday’s game. Costa Rica looked to sit deep and wait for US mistakes/fatigue before moving forward through counter attacks. Costa Rica withstood the initial US pressure and capitalized on the US’s lack of finishing and consistency by scoring a deserved 2^nd half goal that stood as the game winner.

Tactics: Makings of an Identity?

The US pressured Costa Rica high up the field throughout the game and the US players appeared to be well instructed with regards to their roles in pressuring/recovering the ball. Interestingly, while offensively the US’s shape was a 4-1-4-1/4-3-3, without the ball the US formed into a 4-4-2 with Donovan joining Altidore to press in the forward line and Edu stepping forward to become even with Torres. This shifting shape between offense and defense worked well in large part due to Donovan’s work rate and ability to drop into the attacking midfield space with the ball and press to become the highest US player up the field without the ball. The US pressure was effective, particularly in the first half when Costa Rica was completely unable to move players forward with possession.

The possible flipside of Klinsmann’s attacking directions is that with the ball, the U.S. showed an increasing lack of patience in build up and selecting attacking opportunities. The wide US players in particular were overzealous in playing forward which led the US to become out of balance and disorganized in the second half. This ultimately led to the poor 2^nd half performance and the disappointing result. Moving forward, Klisnmann must instill an appreciation for the balance between the strategic importance of maintaining possession if the team adopt a high pressure system without the ball.

One point regarding the 4-3-3/4-4-2 shape is that playing with a back 4 may have been unnecessary and a tactical mistake. Since Costa Rica played with two forwards, the US could have lined up with a back three (possibly bringing in Ream instead of one of the outside backs?) in a 3-4-3 system. This is a tactic that has been used by Marcelo Bielsa with Chile and Athletic Bilbao and recently by Barcelona in their domination of Villareal. A 3-4-3 shape would maintain a numerical superiority in the back while pushing an additional player into the midfield, either in the #10 role behind the striker or as a wide midfielder a la Dani Alves. Given the preference of CONCACAF teams of playing a 2 striker system (including Mexico) this may be a system worth testing.

The US back 4. Could a back 3 be more effective?

Finally, Torres’ performance was far superior to that of any US midfielder in recent memory. Klinsmann should be applauded for recognizing Torres’ quality and for making the decision to start Torres in a central position after making the mistake of using him as an outside winger against Mexico.

The US Central Midfield: Vast improvement

The key deficiency in the match against Mexico was the inability of the central midfielders to dictate the US buildup and create attacks through possession. The central midfield trio of Beckerman-Jones-Bradley was replaced by Edu-Torres-Donovan for the Costa Rica game. In the first half, the play of Torres and Donovan brought the US’s passing and possession game to a different level as compared to any US performance in recent memory.

Torres’ play was the main difference. His ability to receive the ball in tight spaces and make correct decisions allowed the US to keep possession and initiate attacks without resorting to low-probability long passes. His first touch and passing range was the best of anyone on the field and his situational awareness was impressive. Most importantly, his first touch and timely decision-making allowed the US to keep the ball moving quickly and open up gaps in the Costa Rica midfield and defense. Torres demonstrated the extremely important understanding of when to make simple horizontal/backwards passes to players in space to reset the buildup and when to look for a decisive pass forward to create dangerous attacks. Finally, Torres worked continuously on defense pressuring from the front and back with speed and intent and won the ball back single-handedly on several occasions.

Torres moves into space between the midfield and forward lines, receives, and turns under pressure ...

... and plays a weighted through ball to Shea

The play of Donovan and Edu complimented Torres, although both players showed weaknesses that detracted from the US’s performance. Donovan’s passing was consistent for the most part and he was dangerous making bursting runs through the midfield although he failed to finish what appeared to be a relatively simple chance in front of goal. In addition, his spacing and defensive work rate were effective.

Edu also made valuable contributions, intercepting several passes and pressuring the CRC midfielders to good effect. However, at times Edu’s decision making was overly reactive which resulted in poor positioning and a failure to contain or influence Costa Rica’s options. On the ball, Edu looked comfortable when he was afforded space and time and showed quality in moving the ball quickly so as not to detract from the US rhythm and buildup. Of concern was Edu’s lack of composure receiving and distributing the ball under pressure, a characteristic that will be problematic against higher quality opposition.

The Wide Players: Volatility leads to failure

The performances of Shea, Rogers, Castillo, and Chandler lacked sophistication and created instability within the US system. With the central midfield dictating possession and tempo of the game, every US player had more touches and more opportunities to influence the US performance. Unfortunately, as Costa Rica settled in and the game progressed, the wide players showed an inability to consistently make the right choice given the situational challenges and overall context of the game.

All of the outside players were too eager to play forward, often showing poor situational awareness and underestimating the risks inherent in preferring direct dribbling or long passes as opposed to finding a simple short pass to maintain possession. Shea and Rogers were too eager to run forward with and without the ball while Castillo and Chandler both played dangerously inaccurate short and long passes. The latter tendency is particularly concerning given the necessity of outside backs to make simple and successful decisions repeatedly throughout the game.

The wide players’ tendencies described above created a fundamental disunity between the deliberate play of the US central midfielders and the volatile decisions of the wide defenders/attackers. While Torres in particular performed well to patiently manage the rhythm of the US buildup and transition in attack in the first half, by the middle of the second half mistakes by the wide players consistently caused the US to lose possession and become stretched/out of balance. This trend led to the systematic failure by the US to keep possession as it had done in the first half and provided counterattacking opportunities to Costa Rica, one of which Costa Rica capitalized upon to score the game’s lone goal.

Of particular concern was the US’s lack of patience and commitment to the deliberate buildup and possession that had served them well in the first half after conceding the goal. The volatility and lack of patient collective buildup that led to the Costa Rica goal became even worse as the US attempted to equalize. Almost immediately, the US began to look desperate with players choosing to dribble and play long passes forward in vain.

Altidore: Incomplete

Jozy Altidore showed improvement from recent US performances, particularly with regards to his defense work rate and ability to receive possession under pressure. However, his decision-making often led to loss of possession and failure to positively influence the US buildup or attack. Altidore’s faulty decision-making combined with inferior technique compared to most international center forwards will hamstring the US progress. If the US is to progress to become a more complete and sophisticated team, Klinsmann must select/develop a more complete central forward.

Bocanegra/Orozco-Fiscal:

The center back pairing of Orozco-Fiscal and Bocanegra was effective when called upon on defense and generally effective in distribution. Because Costa Rica sat back for most of the game, the key contributions of the center backs were when the United States were in possession. Orozco-Fiscal looked particularly calm and effective distributing the ball. Bocanegra still looks to lack composure in certain situations on the ball and played several poor passes into pressure when he could’ve reset the build up be playing back to Orozco Fiscal or Tim Howard. The goal scoring opportunities came as the result of midfield breakdowns and left the two center backs with little chance at breaking up the Costa Rican chances.

This is a guest post by Jacques Pelham. You can find more of his soccer writing at the Football Garden.

The Klinsmann era of U.S. Soccer began in earnest Wednesday with the U.S. Men’s National Soccer Team facing Mexico in a friendly match just weeks after a deserved 4-2 defeat against the Mexicans in the CONCACAF Gold Cup final. The Gold Cup was a fitting end to the Bob Bradley era, which had been marred by inconsistency and lack of progress despite achieving utilitarian results in major competitions.

Moving into the Klinsmann era of U.S. Soccer, expectations are high. There is a sense from educated observers and the emerging American soccer media that Klinsmann has the pedigree, knowledge, and savvy to progress and develop U.S. Soccer further than any of his predecessors. Of high priority to both internal and external U.S. Soccer constituents is developing a style and identity for U.S. Soccer that can be transmitted from the Men’s Senior national team down through all levels of U.S. Soccer. Klinsmann is charged with not only achieving expected results given the teams recent levels of success, but engineering an on field product that combines key elements of the modern game with an American cultural identity that values hard work, perseverance, and, above all, winning.

The key to achieving these desired results is consistency, starting with establishing and clearly communicating the philosophical underpinnings and the individual expectations and responsibilities related to the style and tactics Klinsmann seeks to adopt. Once the philosophy and style is formed and in place, it will be necessary for Klinsmann to select players with consistently high levels of technical capabilities and tactical cognition in order to produce a final product that is competitive with the best national teams in the world.

Wednesday’s game against Mexico provided the first competitive display of the on field product resulting from Klinsmann’s efforts. Given the little amount of time between his appointment and the match, Klinsmann could not be expected to implement wholesale player selection changes or fine-tune the tactical roles and responsibilities for each of the team’s players. However, several of Klinsmann’s player selections and the formation he selected for the game were departures from his predecessor Bob Bradley, evidence of the beginnings of incremental changes to the identity of the Team and a new set of ideas within the leadership of U.S. Soccer.

After the announcement of his hiring and in various pre-match interviews, Klinsmann made references to implementing an “attacking” style of play with the caveat that, against Mexico, more conservative tactics would likely be needed to achieve success. Consistent with this statement, the U.S. sat very deep in its own half without much possession throughout the first half and well into the second half doing little to influence the game. After second half substitutions, in particular the introduction of Juan Agudelo the U.S. was far more aggressive and proactive higher up the pitch. These changes were effective, leading to the Robbie Roger’s goal as well as what appeared to be a clear penalty on Landon Donovan and Torrado’s last man foul on Rogers.

Wednesday’s match was the beginning of what is hopefully a more consistent and attractive era of U.S. Soccer. Few valuable conclusions regarding Klinsmann’s tactical competence, leadership, or man management can be drawn from the 1-1 result or the on-field display put forth by the U.S. players. What can be concluded is that there is much work to be done on and off the field to form the U.S. Players into a concerted, cohesive unit that demonstrates the technical and tactical consistency necessary to compete with the best national soccer teams in the world.

The Opposition-Mexico

Mexico is the clear reference point and rival for the U.S. in the CONCACAF region. With a mix of experienced and skilled veterans and marquee young attacking talents, Mexico has the ability to expose individual weaknesses and collective disorganization to great effect and is currently the best team in CONCACAF. Throughout Wednesday’s game, Mexico showed quality in possession and commitment to pressuring without the ball. Like in the Gold Cup final, Mexico looked to dominate possession and play the game in the U.S.’s half. Without Javier Hernandez and with Dos Santos used as a substitute, Mexico looked less dangerous in attack than it did in the Gold Cup final and failed to create consistent goal scoring opportunities. Despite the attacking absences, Mexico took the lead somewhat early and continued to dominate possession and the game until midway through the second half when it conceded a goal and was lucky to finish the game with a tie.

The U.S. With the Ball

While the U.S. initially showed a greater commitment to building from the back and keeping possession of the ball, the team was unable to break down Mexico or find players in dangerous spaces through patient build up. Simply stated, the U.S. consistently failed to demonstrate few, if any, of the qualities necessary to create attacking chances by maintaining possession against an organized and disciplined team.

The key tactical consistency issue while the U.S. was in possession was the lack of a shared understanding/commitment of where and how the ball should be played in a given situation (transition immediately after recovery, building from the back, offensive third etc…). Rather than proactively choosing the best trajectory of the pass or dribble before receiving the ball, the tendency of all the U.S. players, and particularly the central midfielders, was to receive the ball and take additional touches/hold the ball while making decisions. This allowed Mexico to pressure the player in possession aggressively and break up U.S. attacks.

The U.S.’s lack of competence in possession was exemplified by the inability of the 3 central midfield players, Kyle Beckerman,, Jermaine Jones and Michael Bradley to influence the game positively or dictate the rhythm of build ups and tempo when the U.S. had the ball.
None of the 3 players seemed familiar or comfortable with the roles required to successfully keep the ball within the 4-2-3-1 system. Each player misplayed simple passes, wandered lethargically into ineffective positions without the ball, and generally took too much time to select and execute passes. These failures allowed Mexico to dominate the central midfield and possess he ball throughout most of the game despite having a numerical disadvantage in the central midfield zone (3 U.S. Players v. 2 Mexican Players).

Of the U.S. Players, Jose Francisco Torres looked most comfortable and decisive on the ball in the first half. However, his initial assigned position on the left wing and his defensive positioning affected his ability to dictate the rhythm and buildup of U.S. possession. Upon replacing Jones in the more central midfield position in the second half, Torres was comfortable on the ball when afforded space and time to receive passes but played several passes that resulted in dangerous interceptions when placed under pressure and was dispossessed at least once after failing to make a simple pass out of pressure.

The inability of the U.S. to develop consistent possession meant that Mexico enjoyed most of the ball and dominated the game, denying the U.S. of a single shot on goal until the second half (which was the result of a corner kick). Mexico were slightly unlucky to not have had more clear chances on goal and failed to convert their dominance of possession into additional goals. This proved costly for Mexico in the second half after key substitutions led to the U.S. reasserting influence over the game, scoring a goal to tie the game and creating chances.

The introduction of Juan Agudelo and the removal of Jermaine Jones and Michael Bradley, led to creation of attacking chances for the U.S. Agudelo was far more active in and out of possession than Edson Buddle and the removal of Jones and Bradley corresponded with Torres and Donovan moving into central positions. While the American’s ability to keep possession after the substitutions remained mediocre, their work rate and commitment to putting Mexico under pressure during their build up increased significantly. Almost immediately, Mexico looked far less composed on the ball, and the U.S. was able to create chances out of interceptions and dispossessing Mexican players.

On the U.S. goal, Brek Shea did very well to receive a pass from Agudelo in traffic and navigate past two Mexican players before playing a nicely weighted low cross to Robbie Rogers. Apart from the Rogers goal, the U.S. was unlucky not to score after Donovan was denied what looked to be a penalty kick and Robbie Rogers was free on goal off a nicely weighted ball by Agudelo before being dragged back by Gerardo Torrado, a foul which arguably should have been punished with a red card.

The U.S. Without the Ball

During the first half and until the introduction of the substitutes in the second half, the U.S. players defensive positioning allowed for generous amounts of time and space for the Mexican defenders and midfielders. The U.S. was not aggressive in recovering possession immediately after being dispossessed and was either unable or uninterested in affecting the rhythm and effectiveness of Mexico’s passing and positioning during their build up play out of the back.

Edson Buddle and Michael Bradley were the highest U.S. players up the field and, neither did much to consistently affect the Mexican defenders/midfielders or influence the game in general. Rather than looking to anticipate and aggressively cutting off space/passing options, both players seemed generally content reacting to whichever way the ball was being played and jogging in that general direction. The U.S. improved dramatically in the second half after Buddle and Bradley were substituted.

Beckerman and Jones sat behind Bradley in the channels to Bradley’s left and right and were decent in cutting off Mexico’s vertical playing options through the center of the field. However, the understanding and communication between the three central midfielders often broke down and lead to several situations where they were positioned too close, too far, or in a flat line with one another, exposing spaces for Mexican players to move into and allowing Mexico to leisurely move the ball through the line and into a higher attacking position.

The wingers (Donovan/Torres) generally started even with Beckerman/Jones when Mexico was building and positioned themselves based on the location of the Mexican outside backs rather than attempting to influence the Mexican player (usually the center backs or Torrado) in possession. At times, this created situations where one or both of Donovan/Torres were even with the back line between the outside back and the touchline. When this occurred, the U.S. had up to six (sometimes more depending on Beckerman/Jones positioning) players flat or close to flat along a very deep back line.

Either by design or in reaction to the U.S. midfielder’s failure to close down space when Mexico was in possession, the U.S. back line remained very deep throughout the game and the central midfielders recovered to position themselves with very little space between the two bands. While this tactic allowed the Mexican players in possession to have plenty of time to receive the ball and choose their next pass, it collapsed the highly dangerous space in the center of the field in between the defenders and midfielders.

Given this dynamic, Mexico’s options were usually to keep possession under little pressure around the 18-yard box, take long shots, or attempt precise through balls to their attacking players into the limited space behind the U.S. back line. The latter approach proved the most dangerous, with Torrado in particular playing several balls into dangerous space that either the U.S. defended against effectively or were called offside against Mexico.

Despite the time and space afforded to them by the U.S., Mexico failed to create dangerous opportunities during open play although the corner kick from which they ultimately scored was the result of possessing the ball and forcing the U.S. to concede a corner. Mexico’s lack of real goal scoring opportunities despite their overall dominance allowed the U.S. to re-establish some influence and tie the game in the second half.

Is this what you want?

My Worry is German Soccer

Everyone knows Germany is a consistent international power. They’re always a contender.

Gary Lineker^* once said:

“Football is a simple game; 22 men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end, the Germans win.”

I think that would suit most people just fine.

But you know what, German soccer has historically been disgusting. They have always been robots with no individual or team flavor, just a dedication to stale ruthless efficiency.

That’s something I want no part of! And I will crucify Klinsi if this is what he implements.

Reason to be hopeful

Having said that, I don’t think it will be the case. For starters, he stood out on those German teams as someone with style and personality. As a kid, he was one of my favorite players. The “dive?” he took in the 1990 World Cup final which led to an Argentine being red-carded and all but securing his team’s victory, says something.

[If you can't see the video, click here.]

In addition, his 2006 Germany showed signs of creativity, and the 2010 version even more so. Not to mention the youth national teams show flavor uncharacteristic of the older generations. The philosophy has changed, and rightly so. I can now watch the Germans without throwing up!

So considering:

• Klinsmann, the player.
• Klinsmann the coach.
• The new German philosophy.
• The undeniable influence of the modern game (ahem … Barca … ahem).

I think – well I hope – Klinsi will try building something worth getting excited about.

* [Can't believe I quoted an English player. That chasing the ball bit certainly fits their philosophy.]

Looks great from 10,000 feet, huh? That’s the resume/pedigree trap. Don’t fall into it, because it loves to claim victims.

Hopefully it’s understood by now that sparkling player resumes don’t correlate with quality coaching. And coaching resumes? Well, we need to be careful.

How many of us followed his 2006 team religiously? Did we analyze every game, every roster call-up or fluctuation, and read or listen to [legit] soccer pundits at the time? How about training sessions? Did we go to any of those?

I didn’t. Sure I watched all his games – sometimes twice. Five years later, all I seem to recall is a traditionally strong Germany, but nothing impressive. So I’m not exactly star-struck.

But, and it’s a huge but, here’s 6 pluses we’ve never had before:

1. He has soccer DNA.
2. If the stories of him rejecting US Soccer’s past offers, and the reasons for the rejections, are true, then he better understands the requirements for long-term success AND he’s in it for the right reasons.
3. He’s made public statements of what he perceives to be the issues with US Soccer and in a tone as if they are correctable. That alone is making him accountable for progress in those areas.
4. Control. I don’t know how much authority he commands, but if it’s “his people” who will run the youth national teams and scouting network, then they too will have soccer DNA and be aligned with #3 above.
5. A stronger global network and credibility. Klinsi’s player recommendation to a South American or Euro club will carry far more weight than Mickey Mouse. Our general American player pool – not just the national team – stands to benefit.
6. More eyeballs. Clubs around the world will be following this USMNT more than ever before. As a result, the exposure our players receive will be unprecedented.

Now is the time to clearly set up expectations. Be specific!

What should his charter be?

I’ve stated this before, but let me repeat not only what I think is achievable, but what everyone should be in line with. He should:

1. Implement a discernible style.
2. Identify and select players that ultimately get picked up and play for Champion’s League level clubs.
3. Results: Maintain CONCACAF dominance with Mexico and get out of group play in World Cup 2014.
4. Hold his youth national team coaches in line with the above three requirements.

These are the critical top-level items that will establish a strong platform upon which we can build something meaningful. That is what I will hold Klinsmann’s tenure accountable to.

Whether you’d like to believe it or not, this is your triumph. I believe Bob was relieved of his duties in large part due to your collective voices.

Like the last point in my optimistic piece, 5 positive influences on US Soccer in 2010, suggested, I had never witnessed such a strong and sustained outcry for the head of our national team coach. And that voice held strong until today.

You would not allow the excuses to continue. You know, all those superficial logical ones that only carry weight among those with snorkel gear, instead of scuba gear. Well, you wouldn’t let them get away with it any longer.

You tweeted, you wrote on facebook, you rebutted on forums, and you were powerful commenters on the blogs!

For me, it was truly interesting watching the transformation in voice and rhetoric from American bloggers who were under attack. It’s not that they had a real change of heart or any enlightening soccer moment; far from it, they’re still clueless as ever! They simply bent under your pressure. Their foundation of excuses, which stem from their lack of deep understanding, and is required to support their flawed philosophy, was buckling. If it weren’t for you, they would just attribute the Gold Cup final to the Cherundolo injury, and we’d all move on.

NO MORE! If they want to appease a more sophisticated readership, they need to go learn! Because catering to the blind horde, of which ironically they are a part of, places them in your crosshairs. And many times, you make them look like the amateurs they are.

And just like you’ve forced their hand, you’ve forced US Soccer’s.

Gulati and company, don’t enjoy the support base from the cheerleading, rosy picture-painting, excuse-making, superficial-understanding media it had not too long ago. And generally, how goes the media, goes the fan-base. Which in turn, has money and job implications.

So everyone’s trying to save their asses! Bob Bradley is the fall guy.

This is an example of how you can introduce accountability. Congratulations on winning this battle.

Tonight I toast to you!

It’s exhausting! You guys could fill the Library of Congress with this stuff …

The Gold Cup Final is No Exception

Let’s start by saying Bob Bradley was a genius.
* He started Freddy Adu – a Turkish 2nd division player. And guess what? Freddy had a good game. What do those lame Benfica guys know about soccer anyways? Genius!
* Not starting Donovan the last 2 matches and injecting him from the get-go here. Genius!
* Dempsey and Donovan swapping up top. Genius!
* Overall game “tactics” … GENIUS!

And rest assured there would be other proclaimed genius moves had the US held off Mexico and won the Gold Cup.

Except we didn’t. We got abused and made Giovanni dos Santos look like f’ing Messi!

So now we talk about this little incident or that little substitution. Now the coach, who remember had been a GENIUS the first 20 minutes, all of a sudden had a lobotomy?

Come on guys! Stop see-sawing after every tournament, every match, every substitution, every play.

You know you’re guilty of it. Tell me you didn’t think BB was brilliant at 2-0.

So what is it? Is the guy a quality international coach or not?

After 5 years, if you still can’t provide a black or white answer and linger in some grey zone that changes hue with every result, then your understanding of the game is suspect.

I mean really, 5 years is not enough to form a coherent, all encompassing diagnosis?

Here. I’ll help out by giving you a 3rd choice:
* Bradley is an average level coach.

Except that it’s really not another choice, is it?
If he’s average, then he’s not quality.

So what the hell are you doing supporting that! Isn’t our ultimate goal to reach the class of “contender”. To have style, to be fluid, to have a roster worth at least $100 million, to be widely respected (don’t kid yourself here). Isn’t that the goal? Project 2010 anyone?

Stop accepting mediocrity, making excuses for it, or searching for the bright side.
Start demanding quality and Storm the Bastille!

This country has the players for the product we desire. You just don’t know it.
And the federation has the resources for a quality manager, but as long as you continue to flow with the changing tide of every game, you’ll never get one.

So I guess what I’m saying here is this:
A big reason Mexico has firmly reclaimed its CONCACAF throne, is on the US Soccer apologists. It is you who give the federation just enough political capital to continue doing what it does.